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Abstract 
Questions regarding the moral responsibility of Internet access and service providers relating to 
information on the Internet call for a reassessment of the ways in which we think about attributing blame, 
guilt, and duties of reparation and compensation. They invite us to borrow something similar to the idea 
of strict liability from the legal sphere and to introduce it in morality and ethical theory. Taking such a 
category in the distribution of responsibilities outside the domain of law and introducing it into ethics, 
however, is a difficult thing. Doing so seems to conflict with some broadly shared and deeply felt 
intuitions regarding the individuality of responsibility and the relationship between responsibility and 
guilt. These convictions coincide with some basic ideas in Kantian moral theory and the ascriptive theory 
based on these ideas. Nevertheless, the problems to which the proposed liabilities / responsibilities relate 
are so serious that they do not seem to leave room for aloofness. At least, they encourage us to reconsider 
the idea of strict liability carefully and to assess its merits.  
Keywords: Internet Providers, Accountability, Responsibility, Liability, Information Technology 
Ethics, Ethics and Law 
INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the burning questions in the debate on new information technologies, ethics and law is about the 
responsibilities of Internet access and service providers (hereafter: IASPs) with regard to the information 
that is originally provided by a content provider and which is made available and accessible by them. 
Should IASPs be blamed for the harm or offense caused by, for example, racist expressions and images, 
slander, offers of drugs, plagiarism, etc., which occur in the contents that are supplied by others? Do they 
have any kind of obligation to prevent or to compensate for the harm and offense that may be caused by 
such matters? These are complicated questions. In this paper, I will not defend a clear-cut “yes” or “no” 
to either of them; I will only sketch some preliminaries for the debate on responsibilities of IASPs. In 
doing so, I will clarify some particularities of the current mainstream in thinking about attributing moral 
responsibility. As a matter of fact, I will argue that if moral responsibilities are to be attributed to IASPs, 
then these responsibilities will be of a kind that is similar to the legal category of strict liability. 
Introducing a category like strict liability in the distribution of responsibilities, outside the domain of law, 
however, is a difficult thing. Doing so seems to conflict with some broadly shared and deeply felt 
intuitions regarding the individuality of responsibility and the relationship between responsibility and 
guilt. These convictions coincide with some basic ideas in Kantian moral theory and mainstream 
ascriptive theory. Ascriptive theory is the special sector of moral philosophy that is dedicated to questions 
concerning the attribution of actions and their consequences to actors. I will explain that the kind of 
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responsibility that perhaps could be attributed to IASPs would better fit in with consequentialist moral 
theories. Nevertheless, I will also show that, with some adjustments, it may in the end also turn out to be 
reconcilable with prevailing Kantianism, the moral outlook that hinges on and is dominated by a 
constitutive ideal of the autonomy and dignity of individual persons. 
 The position that I will defend differs significantly from the one defended some years ago by Deborah 
Johnson.1 Johnson suggests that the relationship between organizations resembling IASPs – she was in 
fact writing about organizations maintaining electronic billboards – and the negative consequences of the 
information put forward by content providers can only be evaluated in terms of the legal category of strict 
liability. She is of the opinion, however, that this is an exclusively legal matter. She opposes the idea of 
applying strict liability to organizations like IASPs on the basis of normative reasons, i.e., reasons 
regarding the conflict that may arise with information-related freedoms. This seems to be right in many 
specific cases. Turning this into a general claim seems to go too far. In any case, Johnson is undoubtedly 
right in assuming that where the question of accountability of IASPs occurs, a notion resembling the one 
of strict liability is conceptually the most suitable to be applied. Johnson is wrong, however, where she 
separates the legal and the moral perspectives so strictly, and where she seems to advocate a kind of 
moral agnosticism regarding the responsibilities of IASPs. It is my opinion that, in doing so, she was led 
by the predominant Kantianism in current ascriptive theory and the part of our moral outlook that reflects 
ascriptive theory. In this paper, I will show that something very similar to the idea of strict liability can 
successfully be incorporated in ascriptive theory and that we may look upon this inclusion as an 
improvement. It is of importance to my point, however, that we should not look upon this as just a legal 
category that is completely outside the moral domain, but as a moral one fully integrated in that domain. 
 It goes without saying that I use the term IASPs for access and service providers, in order to delineate 
the functions of access and service providers in abstracto. I am fully aware of the fact that, nowadays, the 
organization that functions as an IASP can also act as a content provider, if only by selecting and editing 
information.  What I will be saying about the organizations, therefore, applies to them in their role of 
IASPs, whatever other roles they may have. 
CONDITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 
 
In this section, I will elaborate on moral responsibility as it is traditionally conceived of in the everyday 
moral debate as well as in ascriptive theory.  
Normally, we use the notion of moral responsibility in at least two ways that should be carefully 
distinguished. We can use it in a primarily retrospective sense and in a primarily prospective sense. The 
former refers to the possibility of ascribing or attributing actions or consequences of actions to agents; the 
latter refers to duties and obligations that can be imposed upon agents.  
For the purposes of this paper, it is important to see that the two cannot be dealt with completely 
separately in the sense that the first cannot be understood adequately without the second. 2 We only hold 
people morally responsible (in the retrospective sense) if they had a responsibility (in the prospective 
sense) to perform or not to perform the action in question at the time when they actually did or did not 
perform that action. To put it differently, it only makes sense to hold a person responsible, 
retrospectively, for action or omission X when he or she was under a relevant duty or obligation regarding 
X.  
Of course, the presence of a retrospective responsibility is just one of the conditions for retrospective 
responsibility. In order to ascertain the moral responsibility of an agent in the primarily retrospective 
sense, one has to make sure that three conditions apply. 
First, there should be a causal relationship of some kind between the agent and the action or the 
consequences of the action.  This relationship can be direct or indirect, substantial or additional. The 
relationship need not be one that can be framed in terms of a sufficient condition or even of a necessary 
condition as long as it contributes in one way or another to the effect. 
Second, the action or the consequences of the action should be performed or produced intentionally. 
This does not mean that the agent should have or should have had a positive desire to bring about the 
                                                        
1 D. Johnson, Computer Ethics. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, N.J., 1994, p. 124-146. 
2 J. Feinberg, Doing and Deserving. Princeton U.P., Princeton N.J., 1970, p. 187-221; H.L.A. Hart 
Punishment and Responsibility. Oxford University Press, New York / Oxford, 1968, p. 211-230. 
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action or its consequences. The only minimal requirement is that he or she at least did not act or did not 
refrain from acting in a state of voluntary ignorance regarding the action or the omission and their 
consequences. 
Although a thorough discussion about this point would go far beyond the purposes of this paper, it 
should be kept in mind that the things that I have said about causality and intentionality are of a rather 
minimalist vein. As I will show later on, it depends on the context, and the kind of action, and the kind of 
value that is at stake, what causal relationship and what kind and degree of intentionality should be 
present.  Both the character of the causal relationship and the kind and intensity of the intention influence 
in a complicated way the degree of blame that is imposed on the actor. Whether someone is blamed for 
doing something wrong and how severely he is blamed depend in part on questions such as: Did he know 
what was going to happen? Did he consciously want that to happen? Was he negligent with regard to 
these things? What was his contribution to the effects involved? Was he kept in ignorance about the 
possible effects? The kind and degree of the causal relationship and the intentionality influence the degree 
of blame that can be imposed upon an actor in a very complicated way. There is no direct, straight 
relationship between them. The character and the magnitude of the harm or offense involved are also of 
importance, as are other aspects of the situation.  
The third condition for responsibility leads us back to the relationship between retrospective and 
prospective responsibility. It should be possible to give a moral qualification of the action or its 
consequences. There must be some kind of moral principle or value consideration that is applicable to the 
action or its consequences. At the time of performing the action or producing the consequences for which 
an agent is held morally responsible, there must be an obligation or duty not to perform or to produce 
them – at least, not in the way that they have been performed or produced eventually. Would there be no 
such duty or obligation, then the action and its consequences would be morally indifferent. There would 
be no need to discover moral responsibility at all.   
The connection between prospective responsibility and retrospective responsibility is not only a 
motivational one; understanding the prospective responsibility involved also focuses our attention on the 
relevant aspects of a situation when we are deciding whether the first and the second condition of 
retrospective responsibility have been satisfied. In order to know exactly where to look and find out if the 
first two conditions are adequately met, it is necessary to know what principle or value consideration is at 
issue. For an answer to the question what kind of moral responsibility – in the sense of duty or obligation 
– an agent has in a given situation, one should first of all give careful consideration to all circumstances. 
Second, one should try to articulate the moral principles or values that call into question these 
circumstances from a moral point of view. Establishing prospective responsibility in this way enables us 
to know on what part of the whole machinery of the action and its consequences and from what 
perspective we have to focus.  Doing so in turn enables us to determine the presence of causality 
relationships and intentionality, and to decide whether these conditions have been met sufficiently or in 
the degree required. Naturally, this impact of prospective responsibility on the determination of 
retrospective responsibility is closely tied to the role of the character and dimension of the harm or 
offense involved in determining the character and degree of the aspects of intentionality and causality. 
The connection between retrospective and prospective responsibility lies mainly in the need of 
including some idea of prospective responsibility in the idea of retrospective responsibility. In order to 
understand fully what retrospective responsibility is, and in order to be able to find out correctly whether 
someone is responsible in specific situations, we need to have some idea of the types of prospective 
responsibility that may apply. The converse relationship is not so strong. It makes perfect sense to 
attribute prospective responsibility to persons without knowing whether these are capable of fulfilling the 
first and the second condition of retrospective responsibility. If, eventually, it turns out that they do not 
fulfil these conditions sufficiently or to the required degree, they are said to be excused. We would not 
say that the normative principle invoked does not apply. If one is seriously investigating prospective 
responsibility, one should, of course, sooner or later verify whether the agent is able to bear this 
responsibility; in other words, whether the agent meets the first two conditions that should be fulfilled for 
being morally responsible in the retrospective sense. Should the agent not meet these criteria, then the 
aforementioned duties and obligations might still apply, though perhaps not as duties or obligations of 
this specific agent, but of other agents.  It might even be one of those tragic cases in which a duty or 
obligation applies without there being anyone who, in this specific situation, is able to fulfil it, so that 
everyone is excused.  
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Now, all that I have said so far about the conditions of responsibility and the interdependence of 
retrospective and prospective responsibilities reflects in large part some fundamental tenets of current 
ascriptive theory and of broadly shared and deeply held moral convictions, “gut-feelings,” of people on a 
more concrete level. This also applies to what I have said about the dependence of the first two conditions 
on the third one, and about the one-sided relationship between retrospective and prospective 
responsibilities. I will return to them shortly. I will end this section by dedicating a few words to our 
reasons for attributing retrospective responsibility. Why are we interested in doing so? Why should we 
care to be accurate when we attribute responsibilities? 
Answers to these questions can again be divided into consequentialist ones and Kantian ones. Oddly 
enough, when asked to give answers to these questions, most people will come up with consequentialist 
considerations. Consequentialist reasons for an accurate attribution of retrospective responsibility seem to 
be more natural than Kantian ones. Consequentialist reasons have, of course, to do with the clear effects 
of accurate attribution of retrospective responsibility. Here, one may think of prevention through 
deterrence or learning. Or one may think of retribution and revenge that may satisfy the preferences or 
needs of people who have been victims of others’ wrongdoings.  Kantian reasons are much more 
complicated.  They are about taking persons seriously as individual moral agents. They have to do with 
respec.t for the identity and the integrity of the agent, which is rather paradoxically expressed by 
establishing his responsibility and blaming him for his wrongdoing and lack of integrity. They are also 
closely connected to concerns about the fairness of judging people and fairness in the distribution of 
blame and praise. In the section on responsibility and guilt, I will return to these reasons for correctly 
attributing moral responsibilities. But first, we must have a closer look at the nature of IASPs. Attributing 
responsibilities to IASPs formed the starting point for the investigation. 
 
CONDITIONS OF RETROSPECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 
 
It is often held that IASPs cannot be held responsible for the morally negative aspects and consequences 
of the information provided by content providers because they cannot control or check on all the 
information that is made accessible through their services.3 I think that this inability of IASPs is, to a 
large extent, just a technical, and perhaps even more, a financial or economic matter. For this reason, it 
should be taken seriously, but, perhaps, not as seriously as it is often done in the debate on the 
responsibilities of Internet providers. On principle and often in fact, the providers are able to become 
aware of possibly harmful or offensive information 
“Ought implies can,” is the traditional axiom held by most moral philosophers. This well-known 
mantra should not keep us from understanding that sometimes things are the other way around: when can 
implies ought. Here, the sheer ability and opportunity to act in order to avoid or prevent harm, danger, 
and offense from taking place put an obligation on an agent. This is the case when harm, danger or 
offense would be considerable while the appropriate action would not present significant risks, costs, or 
burdens to the agent, whether a natural person or an organization.4 The absence of other agents with the 
same kind of abilities and opportunities can make the duty to act even weightier.  
With regard to potentially harmful or offensive information, e.g., racist phraseology, false 
incriminations, sale of illegal drugs, plagiarism, etc., the moral responsibilities not to harm and not to 
offend regard in the first place the content providers. These are the authors or those who publish the 
material on the net. However, given the fact that the content providers do not take their responsibilities 
seriously, the only ones who can prevent the materials from becoming available or accessible are the 
IASPs. At least they are the only ones who can try to do so, and who may succeed in doing so to a certain 
extent.  It goes without saying that this has complicated, important technical and financial aspects. 
Nevertheless, the fact that IASPs have that possibility cannot be denied. 
In the absence of other agents with the same abilities and opportunities, IASPs have weighty duties to 
prevent harm and offense that may be the effects of publishing materials on the net. The question how the 
                                                        
3 That they should not be held responsible because there are conflicting values at stake, such as 
information-related freedoms, privacy of content providers, etc., is an interesting and, to my mind, in 
large part defensible point of view. Unfortunately, I cannot deal with it within the confines of this paper. 
4 T.L. Beauchamp and J.F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 4th ed. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1994, p. 266; W. Frankena, Ethics. 2nd ed. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,1973, pp. 45-48. 
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providers should fulfil their responsibilities exactly cannot be answered here. Instead, I will elaborate 
somewhat on the urgency of the providers taking their responsibilities seriously. 
IASPs are similar to the providers of the traditional mass media. Just like radio, television, or, for that 
matter, a cable network, the Internet offers opportunities to distribute textual information, images, or 
sound recordings on an enormous scale. There is little disagreement about the view that the freedom of 
the more traditional mass media like radio and television to provide information and services should be 
restricted by certain limiting conditions regarding harmfulness and offensiveness.  Many of these 
traditional media do not produce, themselves, the information and services they transmit or make 
accessible. In this respect, IASPs do not differ from them. Nevertheless, the traditional mass media are 
not free to broadcast or distribute whatever textual information, sounds, or pictures. They are, for obvious 
reasons, bound by minimum moral standards concerning the prevention and avoidance of harm and 
offense.  There is no reason at all to think that these standards should not also apply to IASPs. 
The similarities between the traditional providers, such as radio and television, and the new providers 
of the Internet are just one reason to think that they are under a similar moral regime. There is another, 
and perhaps more important, reason to think that moral restrictions apply to Internet providers. Lack of 
barriers and easy accessibility of textual information, pictures, and sounds is one of the intriguing 
characteristics of the Internet. It is relatively easy to disseminate information through the Internet. 
Publishers, broadcasting companies, printing offices, production houses can all be left aside. In principle, 
whatever one likes to publish can be put on the Internet straight from the home, all by oneself. 
Conversely, it is also very easy to gain access to this information. The recipients need not go to a 
bookshop, buy their copy of a book or a magazine; they need not wait until the information they want or 
need is shown on television or broadcast on the radio. They can pick it up at the time they desire, in the 
way and the circumstances they desire.  In short, they are not, or at least much less, hindered by barriers 
that were formerly present when people tried to get information and materials through media like 
newspapers, magazines, books, (propaganda) leaflets, radio, and television. The fact that such barriers are 
fading away may, in a certain respect, be considered a good thing. In a sense, easy accessibility advances 
the equality of opportunities in our societies, where information becomes one of the most important assets 
and means to obtain welfare and well-being.  Nevertheless, it is rather naive to think that all information 
is useful to the purposes of welfare and well-being. Victims of racist rhetoric, of hatred campaigns or just 
of the many stupid, undocumented mythological stories on the Internet about diseases such as AIDS or 
cancer, may testify: not all information is valuable. There is no value in information that is not a work of 
art, lacks truth, or compromises fundamental moral principles (without compensating this by exhibiting 
amusing, artistic, scientific, or technical qualities). Before the Internet came into existence, offensive and 
harmful information was far more difficult to attain. You had to go to a bookshop. You had to await the 
mailing of the local aberrant political denomination. Or you could switch on your radio or television, fold 
open your tabloid, and wait for silly information. Now, silliness, bigotry, and sheer hate are just some 
mouse clicks away from you, to take in when, where, and for as long as you like. 
RESPONSIBILITY AND GUILT 
 
The main argument for attributing responsibilities to IASPs, as put forward in the previous section, seems 
to be primarily forward-looking, future oriented. It is focused on the IASPs' capabilities to prevent harm 
and offense. Backward-looking ideas about guilt or taking individuals seriously as moral actors and about 
assigning praise and blame correctly do not seem to play such an important role. This, however, is not 
completely true. The three elements that must be present for assigning moral responsibility can also be 
present in the case of IASPs. We can see this once we accept the idea that ability and opportunity can 
sometimes create obligation and agree that the complementary contribution of IASPs is of causal 
relevance to the offensive or harmful effects of publishing certain items on the Internet. 
   There are obvious difficulties with assigning such backward-looking responsibilities. I think, however, 
that these can be overcome. 
   First, there is an objection to the attribution of both prospective and retrospective moral responsibilities. 
This has to do with the fact that IASPs are, for the greater part, private organizations that have to make 
profits in a context of commercial competition; this could be considered an obstacle to attributing moral 
responsibilities to them. It is sometimes believed that organizations such as business corporations have no 
moral responsibilities. Milton Friedman is often cited to explain that business organizations, or rather 
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their managers, have no special competence or expertise concerning social and moral matters. According 
to Friedman, if they were to have these responsibilities, then these responsibilities might easily conflict 
with their obligations to make profits for the stockholders.5 
   As to this first objection, Friedman did not claim that managers of private organizations, such as 
business corporations, have no moral responsibilities at all. He held that business is bound by moral 
norms of minimal decency, meaning that they should avoid and prevent harm. Friedman only wanted to 
exclude responsibilities or duties of positive beneficence (e.g., funding education and health care for the 
worst-off in the region of the firm, etc.). Friedman had a moral reason for not attributing duties of positive 
beneficence to business. He thought that such activities should be democratically controlled and not 
decided upon by private persons. According to him, the latter could easily feel tempted to use the 
enormous power of their corporations for their own, subjective purposes.  
   But does the argument hold when applied to providers, who often do not produce the product of 
information, but are just intermediaries? I do not think so. Little specific competence or expertise is in 
fact needed to observe where textual information, images, or sound could be harmful or offensive. 
Obviously, not every possibility of harm or offense can be understood beforehand. And, of course, 
harmfulness and offensiveness are matters of degree. This, however, does not mean that clear cases of 
harm and offense cannot be discovered and need not be tackled. From the difficult and vague cases, we 
need not at all conclude that every effort to reveal harm and offense and to block further possibilities of 
harming and offending is useless. Finally, one might consider the fact that IASPs are organizations with 
the aim to make profits as one more reason to ascribe moral responsibilities. The fact that they can make 
profits by contributing to the fact that certain people in society are put at the risk of being harmed or 
offended is just one more reason to hold them responsible. 
   Second, the collectivity of actors may be considered a problem that is in the way of attributing 
retrospective moral responsibilities of this kind to IASPs. An IASP is an organization, not a person. Many 
actors, Internet users, or consumers as well as content providers and the organizations of IASPs are 
involved in the process of diffusing information on the Internet. IASPs can only function as providers 
because they are, as it were, elements in a series connection. The functioning of other providers, in other 
words, is essential to their own performance. Finally, an IASP accommodates in its systems the 
information of an enormous number of content providers, among whom are content providers who have 
subscriptions to other IASPs.  Because of all these reasons, attributing responsibility to IASPs cannot be 
done in the same relatively straightforward sense as attributing responsibility to individual persons. 
                                                        
5 M. Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,” The New York Times 
Magazine, September 13, 1970. 
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   The second objection does not hold. Although attributing responsibilities to collectivities may be 
complicated, it is not necessarily practically and conceptually impossible. Over the last decades, various 
studies have been published in which a whole range of arguments has been given for attributing 
responsibilities to collectivities. Some of these are based on ingenious interpretations of organizations and 
decision-making procedures in organizations and their resemblance to persons.6 Others start from 
consequentialist arguments about the didactic, deterring, or preventive effects of such attributions.7 In 
addition, it should be observed that attributing blame and praise to collectivities such as private 
organizations, as a matter of fact, is something that happens all the time. People think and talk in terms of 
attributing responsibilities to organizations and they establish single-issue organizations in order to 
motivate other organizations to take their responsibilities seriously. The law establishes responsibilities 
and liabilities of organizations. Therefore, one should rather wonder, why in certain regions in the field of 
moral philosophy, the idea of collective responsibility has still not been accepted. The underlying reason 
for this might be a Kantian bias combined with methodic individualism, like the one that seems to be 
characteristic of the Kantian moral outlook mentioned in the first objection. Seen from the angle of the 
traditional idea of directly guilt-related responsibility, it is indeed difficult to understand exactly what it 
means to hold a collectivity responsible, where this responsibility cannot in any clear way be distributed 
among the individual members of the collectivity. Nevertheless, attributing such responsibilities just 
seems to work. Organizations learn from it and change their behavior on the basis thereof. Perhaps, then, 
it should just simply be admitted that the responsibilities attributed to collectivities, because of their basic 
function, differ partially from the ones attributed to individuals. 
 Finally, and most importantly, we come to the objection that to my mind is the most appealing: the 
apparent irreconcilability of the Kantian and consequentialist moral outlook. Attributing retrospective 
moral responsibility to IASPs is primarily inspired by reasoning of a rather consequentialist kind. Doing 
so is, in a way, instrumentalist, and may therefore be intuitively felt to be unfair. The categories of blame 
and guilt are used for purposes that do not relate to the identity and (the lack or restoration of) the 
integrity of the acting party. This does not seem to do justice to the requirement of respect that we think 
we ought to pay to the individual persons involved, even by blaming or punishing him or her ... at least if 
our morality is of a Kantian vein.  
 It looks as if this objection is at least in part a question of fundamental outlook, of basic ideological 
orientation. Nevertheless, it can be argued that attributing responsibilities to IASPs is in large part 
reconcilable with Kantianism.  
   Although attributing responsibilities to IASPs is something, that is at face value more familiar to 
consequentialist stances in morality, it is nevertheless closely tied to the ways in which responsibility is 
traditionally attributed to individuals. Important in this respect is that the idea of a causal relationship – 
albeit a secondary or additional one – is not completely abandoned, as is the case in certain respects with 
the legal idea of strict liability. For the assignment of strict liability, the existence of a causal relationship 
between (the actions of) an agent and the accomplishment of a certain risk need not be substantiated. 
Strict liability sees more to the practicalities of compensating or preventing losses that result from certain 
risks for all the parties involved than to the character and identity of the acting party. In the case of 
attributing responsibilities to IASPs, considerations like these are of importance, but the causality aspect 
is not overlooked. This is so because the requirement of the causal relationship guarantees that it is 
exactly those who contributed to harm or offense on whom the responsibilities are imposed and who are 
thereby stimulated to learn from experience and to prevent harm and offense in the future.  In this way, 
even attributing this kind of responsibility pertains to the identity and integrity of the agent. Although, 
therefore, the consequences of prevention, learning, and deterrence are undoubtedly preponderant among 
the reasons for attributing responsibilities to IASPs, doing so may have some intuitive appeal to Kantians 
in so far as it indirectly sees to the identity and integrity of the acting organization. 
Second, as I have explained extensively in the section on conditions of responsibility, even in the 
traditional views on retrospective responsibility there is a close relationship between retrospective and 
                                                        
6  P.A. French, P.A., Collective and Corporate Responsibility. Columbia U.P., New York, 1984; L. May 
and S. Hoffman, Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics, 
Rowman and Littlefield, Savage Md., 1991 
7 A.H. Goldman, The Moral Foundations of Professional Ethics. Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, N.J, 
1980 
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prospective responsibility.  This relationship comes clearly to light in the dependence of the causality and 
intentionality conditions on the character and the dimension of the harm or offense involved.  The 
significance of the consequences of an action for the requirements regarding the causal relationship and 
the intentionality, to my mind, at least hints at the functionality of the attribution of retrospective moral 
responsibility for the ways in which we deal with harm and offense. Put differently, the future-oriented, 
instrumental approach of moral responsibility, which we might associate with consequentialism, is not at 
all strange to the traditional idea of retrospective responsibility.  
Third, as I already mentioned at the end of the section on conditions of responsibility, when asked for 
reasons for attributing retrospective moral responsibility, most people will come up with consequentialist 
considerations. The strange thing is that the highly Kantian idea of retrospective moral responsibility, at 
least in what seems to be a kind of common-sense approach, is embedded in a motivational structure of a 
highly consequentialist nature. I consider this to be one more reason to assume that the Kantianism of the 




If IASPs have responsibilities relating to information produced by others but accessible through their 
services, then these responsibilities are different from the responsibilities that are traditionally attributed 
to individual persons. They are, however, not completely different. Basic to the traditional idea of 
responsibility – at least when taken as retrospective responsibility – is the assignment of guilt, which is 
something that has to do with the identity and the character of an actor.  When moral responsibilities 
regarding negative aspects of information that are accessible through their services, are attributed to 
IASPs, the primary concern is not so much with guilt but with preventing or compensating for these 
negative consequences. This, however, is not to say that the question of guilt is completely put aside. I 
have argued that, whereas this idea may, as such, suit people with a consequentialist moral outlook very 
well, it may at first and in some respects be difficult to accept for Kantians. The idea does not completely 
abandon the requirements of a causal relationship and intentionality and, therefore, is not completely 
alienated from a guilt-centered conception of responsibility. 
 One may ask whether this whole argument about responsibilities that are better adjusted to 
consequentialism than to Kantianism and responsibilities that better fit with Kantianism than with 
consequentialism is not a rather inner-philosophical debate of relatively little importance to everyday life. 
Is it not a philosophical maneuver aiming at the solution of a problem caused by philosophical 
idiosyncrasies? Without wanting to be immodest, I do not think so. I think that it is important to update 
our philosophical conceptual frameworks and vocabularies – and by doing so also our concrete moral 
concepts and words – frequently in order to adapt them to the new circumstances of our ever-developing 
societies. Doing so supplies us with conceptual instruments with which we are better fitted to approach 
contemporary social problems. Reconsidering moral responsibility and introducing a category of 
responsibility that is oriented toward results and consequences seems all but redundant in an age that 
witnesses an exponential growth of technologies, the rise of enormous transboundary organizations, and a 
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